{"id":1989,"date":"2026-04-29T15:27:18","date_gmt":"2026-04-29T15:27:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/?p=1989"},"modified":"2026-04-29T15:27:18","modified_gmt":"2026-04-29T15:27:18","slug":"the-suweida-conflict","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/?p=1989","title":{"rendered":"The Suweida Conflict"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Introduction<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The Syrian Civil War, having dragged on for some 11 years, has largely concluded. That is about where the knowledge of most people ends. In reality though, a new wave of sectarian violence has set in and the fate of Syria is soon to be decided based on whether the new central government can unify the country. In particular, however, the Druze conflict proves to be a fascinating case study, bluntly showing the difficulty of Syrian reconciliation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Context<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Following the Arab Spring of 2011\u2014 a wave of largely pro-democracy and anti-authoritarian protests across the Arab world\u2014Syria descended into a civil war. The main factors of the war were the central government and a collection of opposing factions usually referred to as the \u201crebels.\u201d These ranged from US-aligned Kurdish fighters, Turkish-aligned Arabs, and various Islamist groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The civil war, while largely non-sectarian, had certain groups aligned more often with different sides. Most famously, the Alawites. They are a breakaway ethnoreligious group concentrated along the Mediterranean coast and stemming from Shia Islam. Because Assad himself was an Alawite, throughout the war they tended to support the Assad regime as opposed to the rebels. Several other groups, like the Druze, have been accused of supporting the regime throughout the war, although these claims are less substantial due to the lack of a clear link between the group and Assad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be specific, however, it was largely the Sunni majority which opposed Assad\u2019s rule, making up the bulk of the rebel forces. One of the rebel groups, known as Hay\u2019at Tahrir al-Sham  (HTS; \u201cLevant Liberation Committee\u201d), spearheaded the 2024 offensive alongside several other groups, overthrowing the regime in the span of a few months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This quick fall is generally attributed to the failings of the other states previously propping up Assad. Russia, the regime\u2019s principal backer, was preoccupied with the ongoing war in Ukraine, which consumed most of its resources. Iran and Hezbollah were generally weakened by the strikes carried out by Israel in Lebanon and Syria itself. The combination of the lack of foreign support and the withdrawal of Hezbollah from Syria, presented a narrow window of opportunity for the HTS to exploit and rapidly take down the Assad regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The HTS is a relatively new group, founded in 2017 as a merger of other Islamist groups. As such, it has drawn great concern from its previous association with Al-Qaeda, but has since attempted to portray itself as more moderate. Many still question exactly how moderate it is, and the previous attitude of the group is starting to show in the internal conflict within Syria that followed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Aftermath of the War<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The end of the civil war left the country in ruins. Millions of homes were destroyed, and the country was left in a dysfunctional state. To stabilize the nation, the HTS set up a transitional government, integrating most of the rebel groups into one central government. This government, led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the former leader of the HTS, has declared that it aims to protect the minorities of Syria. In this, it has largely failed. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced since.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Alawites are considered the first victims of the post-Assad violence, with thousands of civilians being killed solely based on religious grounds. These extrajudicial killings, according to some firsthand reports, began with HTS-aligned militants asking civilians \u201cAre you Alawite?\u201d and looting the houses of those who responded yes. Rape, looting, beatings, and other crimes are all believed to have been perpetrated against the Alawites according to both the UN security council, Reuters, Euronews, and several other outlets. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then they came for the Druze. The Druze are another ethnoreligious group, mostly populating the southern province of Suweida. Whilst the Alawites had a very clear connection to the regime, the Druze were more ambiguous. Some sided with it for their own personal safety, others vehemently opposed it. Indeed, the Druze were a key part of the southern offensive against Assad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following the initial post-war phase, conflict occurred mainly between the Druze militia and the Syrian transitional authority. Since then, however, the violence has largely shifted to be between the Druze and Bedouins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Violence in Damascus & Suweida<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

To preface, this conflict remains complex and poorly understood in Western analysis, having very few English source articles. Coverage is generally episodic, with the vast majority of publicity only arriving at the most heated moments of the conflict. Hence, there are few comprehensive analyses available, even a year later. Still, to put it briefly, there were two general periods of violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Firstly, between April and May 2025, there was a period of conflict specifically between Druze groups and groups aligned with the transitional government. Tensions escalated, in part due to the circulation of a \u201ccontroversial audio recording\u201d which caused violence to erupt in two small cities next to Damascus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two days later, the violence spread to a few towns in Suweida itself. There were several reports of extrajudicial killings perpetrated by groups associated with the government, and the fighting culminated in around 20 civilians killed with another 100 fighters also being killed, most of them Druze.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most notably, this included an Israeli intervention. Some Druze, mainly those under the spiritual leader Hikmat Al-Hijri, claimed it was essential for defending the Druze. Largely speaking, while the Druze ended up partially integrating into the government military on May 1st, the conflict sparked debate about the role of the Druze in the new Syria. This all set the stage for the violence in July with the Bedouins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Bedouin Conflict<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The Bedouin are yet another sectarian group in the Middle East, also having population centers in Suweida. The conflict between them and the Druze allegedly began when a Druze merchant was abducted on the 11th of July, which triggered a response two days later. Some newspapers state that he was beaten, whilst others are much more vague on what really happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the abduction, the Druze detained several Bedouins who were thought to be involved, which escalated into the Bedouins establishing checkpoints across Suweida and detaining fourteen Druze. Violence quickly followed, with reports of explosions and shelling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The violence turned into almost a thousand people being killed, with hundreds of thousands being displaced from their homes. Cases of looting and rape were also reported, with the quick escalation of the sectarian conflict stunning the entire Druze community.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Al-Hijri, a few days after the kidnapping, called for the international community to intervene in order to prevent the violence. And so, as before, Israel intervened militarily based on the claim it was defending the Druze community in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How aligned the Bedouins were with the central government is not stated very clearly anywhere, though it is assumed that they were more or less loyal to the government. In addition, the opinions of the Druze were largely divided between those supporting and opposing the transitional authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following all the violence, on the 14th of July, the Syrian government announced it would intervene militarily to end the violence, which was followed by a ceasefire agreement with the Druze the following day. This agreement largely fell through, and violence continued regardless. Looting was commonplace amongst Druze soldiers, and countless atrocities were committed against the Druze throughout the conflict.

There hasn\u2019t been a single conclusion to it, but the reporting stopped around September of 2025. The Druze in Syria have, in response to the violence, largely fixed on an anti-government viewpoint with all three spiritual leaders critiquing its handling of the situation. Several Druze militant groups also merged around mid-August into the \u201cNational Guard\u201d for Suweida under the leadership of Al-Hijri, solidifying their opposition to reintegration desired by the central government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Loyal Druze<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Contrary to what may be implied from the current events, the Druze are far from an unruly sectarian group. Their roots are largely in obedience and deep integration, being fiercely loyal and contributing to whichever society they find themselves under.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Druze, as a group, are unlike many others. Branching off from Shia Islam, the faith was born in Egypt. They were forced to flee however, and settled largely in the mountains around the Levant. They have a presence in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, but most of all, Syria. As a survival mechanism, they have tended to be very loyal to whichever nation happens to rule them. In the Lebanese Civil War, the Druze sided with the generally Muslim factions, and in Mandatory Palestine, they sided largely with the Jews.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Druze in Israel are particularly fascinating, being the only large non-Jewish group burdened with military service. This was not out of force, but rather, out of their own request to serve. After the war of independence, the Druze had realized that the only way they could truly integrate into Israeli society was by way of the military. The Druze today are well liked, getting along well with neighbouring Jewish villages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Druze loyalty to Israel began even earlier, however. In the late 1920\u2019s, when Jews began immigrating to Palestine on a larger scale, the Druze largely received them well and ignored the negative sentiment of the muslim Arabs, who saw the immigration as a threat. Then, during the civil war and subsequent war of independence, the Druze sided with the Jews, predicting that they would be victorious. Throughout their history within their host countries, they have consistently been loyal in a way which hasn\u2019t been seen in many other ethnic minorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Suweida Question<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Many have begun considering the possibility of an independent state in Suweida. Up until the recent violence, most agreed that a large degree of regional autonomy would be far more beneficial, where most Druze explicitly stated their commitment to the Syrian identity. However, now their leadership feels largely betrayed, finding their only true \u201cally\u201d in Israel which acts largely influenced by its own Druze community repeatedly pressuring the government to intervene.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is not to say that Israel\u2019s intervention is entirely out of care for the Druze; the majority stems from its own national security interests\u2014especially considering the concerning past of key figures and factions of the transitional government. It is undeniable that Israel has distrusted the new government from the beginning. Although there were initially rumors of peace talks, these seem to have largely died down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The idea of an independent state in Suweida is largely supported by, in specific, Al-Hijri. While the other two leaders lean toward autonomy, Al-Hijri has since demanded total independence from the Syrian government. Still, he acknowledges that this is largely impractical in the short term and has proposed a transitional phase with Israel as a guarantor. Al-Hijri is almost certainly the most controversial Druze figure. Additionally, the reason why he sees Israel as a more reliable ally to the Druze than Syria can be largely attributed to how Israel treats its own Druze. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some, like Bassim Abu Fakhr, a commander and spokesman of the Men of Dignity group, tend to agree. The group was one which joined the National Guard of Suweida slightly later after its founding. In an NPR interview, he stated that \u201cafter what happened on the coast, we have reached the conclusion that if the situation continues like this, we are not capable of living together” with other sects, he said \u2014 especially Islamist Sunni Arabs.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The consensus is clearly moving more and more away from Syria, and it is yet to be determined what long term strategy the Druze choose. This may signal a departure from their survival strategy of unquestioned loyalty, or at the very least a drift closer towards Israel and further away from the Arab world. The region is experiencing a shift unseen before, where the balance of power constantly alternates between different players amid increasingly more devastating civil wars and internal conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The Druze are a fascinating group. They have been an \u201cideal minority,\u201d for hundreds of years, and the conflict in Syria has proven to demonstrate the potential complexity and depth of sectarian conflicts. Sectarianism is seen as an issue of the past in the West, making way for larger inter-state conflicts, but the Middle East\u2019s perpetual intrigue is largely because of sectarianism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geopolitically speaking, the fall of the Assad regime has been an unquestionable blow to Iran and Russia\u2019s sphere of influence in the region. However, the conflict with the Druze has seen Israel begin to expand its own sphere of influence into southern Syria. Northern Israel has been in an exceptionally precarious situation throughout the conflict with Lebanon, hence why Israel is keen to retain as much control as it can in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sectarian violence is certainly going to play a large role, even in inter-state conflicts. For instance, the ongoing war in Iran has put to question the status of Iran\u2019s own ethnic minorities, with the Kurdish minority in particular being cited as a possible means to overthrow the regime from within. They most likely will not be able to succeed in the shorter term, but their grievances will certainly influence the future actions of Iran\u2019s opponents. What the Syrian government chooses to do in terms of the Druze issue may set a precedent spanning the entire region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the Druze go on to decide, and how the situation in Syria plays out, are all largely a mystery. The question of the future of Syria is still unanswered, and will likely only be determined by the possible success or failure of democracy in the country. In particular, Islamism has been abundantly highlighted as the alternative to the secular authoritarianism of Assad, and whether the nation can break free of both will determine the future of Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Works Cited<\/em><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Ari, Lior Ben. \u201cAt Least 18 Killed in Clashes between Druze, Bedouins in Southern Syria.\u201d Ynet<\/em>, 13 July 2025, www.ynetnews.com\/article\/hya0011511llx. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arraf, Jane. \u201cDruze Militias Are Suspicious of Syria\u2019s New Leaders — and Are Ready to Go to Battle.\u201d NPR<\/em>, 9 Apr. 2025, www.npr.org\/2025\/04\/09\/g-s1-58707\/syria-druze-militias. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bahar, Tal. \u201cBlood Covenant: Israel and the Druze.\u201d The Reflector<\/em>, Jewish Community Federation of Richmond, 24 July 2025, www.reflectornews.org\/federation-news\/blood-covenant. Accessed 25 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bourne, Victoria, and David Gritten. \u201cSyria: Clashes between Druze and Bedouin in South Kill 30.\u201d BBC<\/em>, 14 July 2025, www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cgmwp70pwmyo. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cDeep Dive: What\u2019s Driving Syria\u2019s Sectarian Violence?\u201d Inkstick Media<\/em>, 26 Sept. 2025, inkstickmedia.com\/deep-dive-whats-driving-syrias-sectarian-violence\/. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ezzeddine, Nancy. \u201cSectarian Violence Threatens Syria\u2019s Chance at Stability.\u201d ACLED<\/em>, 25 July 2025, acleddata.com\/report\/sectarian-violence-threatens-syrias-chance-stability. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghaith Abdul-Ahad. \u201c\u2018What Reconciliation? What Forgiveness?\u2019: Syria\u2019s Deadly Reckoning.\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, 2 Sept. 2025, www.theguardian.com\/news\/2025\/sep\/02\/the-long-read-syria-sectarian-violence-revenge-killings. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gritten, David, and Rachel Hagan. \u201cClashes Reported after Syria and Kurdish-Led SDF Agree Ceasefire.\u201d BBC<\/em>, 18 Jan. 2026, www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c4gwk37ewvwo. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Holyoke, Gregory. \u201cExclusive: Who Are Syria\u2019s Druze and Why Are They under Attack?\u201d Euronews<\/em>, 23 July 2025, www.euronews.com\/2025\/07\/23\/exclusive-who-are-syrias-druze-and-why-are-they-under-attack. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jihad Yazigi. \u201cAnalysis: HTS Offensive Shakes Foreign Powers Geopolitical Calculations (Open Access).\u201d Syria Report<\/em>, 4 Dec. 2024, syria-report.com\/analysis-hts-offensive-shakes-foreign-powers-geopolitical-calculations\/. Accessed 25 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reuters Staff. \u201cBodies and Looted Homes: Syria\u2019s Druze Reeling after Sweida Bloodshed.\u201d Reuters<\/em>, 18 July 2025, www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/bodies-looted-homes-syrias-druze-reeling-after-sweida-bloodshed-2025-07-18\/. Accessed 25 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Samia Mekki. \u201cSuwayda Violence: Head of Israel\u2019s Druze Calls on Europe to Act.\u201d Euronews<\/em>, 4 Sept. 2025, www.euronews.com\/2025\/09\/04\/suwayda-violence-head-of-israels-druze-calls-on-europe-to-act-and-defends-israeli-strikes. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cSecurity Council Voices Deep Concern over Deadly Escalation in Syria\u2019s Sweida Region.\u201d UN News<\/em>, 10 Aug. 2025, news.un.org\/en\/story\/2025\/08\/1165620. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Syria TV. \u201cHijri: Full Independence for Suweida Is Our Demand, and Israel Is the Only Guarantor – the Syrian Observer.\u201d The Syrian Observer<\/em>, 13 Jan. 2026, syrianobserver.com\/syrian-actors\/hijri-full-independence-for-suweida-is-our-demand-and-israel-is-the-only-guarantor.html. Accessed 24 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wolinski, Sofia Josephine. \u201cThe Druze Community in Israel: A Model of Minority Integration.\u201d Georgetown Journal of International Affairs<\/em>, 21 Apr. 2025, gjia.georgetown.edu\/2025\/04\/21\/the-druze-community-in-israel-a-model-of-minority-integration\/. Accessed 25 Mar. 2026.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction The Syrian Civil War, having dragged on for some 11 years, has largely concluded. That is about where the knowledge of most…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":66,"featured_media":1990,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1989","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1989","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/66"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1989"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1989\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1991,"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1989\/revisions\/1991"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/1990"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1989"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1989"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blueandread.asbarcelona.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1989"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}